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This article sets out to evaluate the constitutionality of the provisions of the Electronic and Postal
Communications Act 2010 (EPOCA) regulating the registration of SIM cards in Tanzania. Particular
focus is cast on the legal implications this law has over the constitutional right to privacy. It is the
author's argument that the Act, being broadly and loosely framed, has legalised the secret
interception of our private communications by the state rather than achieving its principal aims. For
such reason, EPOCA contravenes the constitutional right to privacy.
Introduction
In January, 2009 the Tanzania Communications Regulatory Authority (TCRA) announced that all
existing and future subscribers of pre-paid SIM cards must be registered.1 This public notice required
mobile service providers to maintain databases of information of their subscribers. Included in such
databases is information on the phone number, name, date of birth, gender, address, alternative
phone numbers (if available), the number on ID card, passport, driving licence, student card, voter
registration card or a letter from a local government official. The deadline for registration was initially
set to six months, i.e. from July 1, 2009 to December 31, 2009. This time-limit was extended for
another period of six months to June 30, 20102 and subsequently for half a month to July 15, 2010.3
As is the case with countries which have implemented mandatory registration of SIM card schemes in
Africa such as Botswana, Kenya, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Ghana, Cameroon
(to name a few), TCRA advanced four reasons in support of registration of pre-paid SIM cards: (1) to
protect consumers from misuse of communication services; (2) to enable consumers to be identified
as they use value added services, such as mobile banking, mobile money transfer, electronic
payments for services such as water, electricity, pay-TV, etc.; (3) to enhance national security; and
(4) to enable network operators to promote “know your customer”.4 It is worthwhile noting here the
fact that the TCRA's directive to service providers to collect personal information from their
subscribers was merely administrative.5 The directive was not backed by any statutory law.
Legislation on mandatory registration of SIM cards only came into force towards the end of the
registration exercise.
This article evaluates the law governing mandatory registration of SIM cards, namely the Electronic
and Postal Communications Act (EPOCA) 2010 from the constitutional right to privacy perspective.
The first part introduces the article. The second part reviews the legislative history for registration of
SIM cards in Tanzania. The objectives and reasons for enacting this law are presented here. The
third part deals with the presentation of the law itself, highlighting the main parts of the legislation. The
fourth part outlines the constitutional right to privacy and when such right can *C.T.L.R. 49 be
derogated. This part basically tests the constitutionality of the provisions of EPOCA on registration of
SIM cards against the right to privacy. The final part concludes the article with two remarks: first,
EPOCA is an interception of communication law. Being framed broadly, and without adequate
safeguards, the law falls below the constitutional standards. Secondly, while the objectives of EPOCA
with regards to registration of SIM cards may still be valid, the Act needs to be significantly amended
ahead of any possible constitutional petition.
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Legislative history for registration of SIM cards
Prior to July 1, 2009 no mobile phone network subscriber in Tanzania was obliged to register his or
her SIM card with the service provider. Registration was only required where a pre-paid subscriber
needed service added value for mobile money transfer such as Vodafone M-PESA, Z-PESA, etc.,
and in the case of post-paid services. At this particular time a potential subscriber could purchase a
SIM card from a street vendor and activate it immediately. He could also transfer it from one cell
phone handset to another. Moreover, a subscriber could give a cell phone handset to a friend as a gift
or transfer it to any other person in return for some money. As there was no registration of SIM cards
or cell phone handsets, thieves could steal cell phone handsets, throw away the SIM cards and sell
them to people on the black market. Some people could also purchase SIM cards and use them to
call or send anonymous life-threatening or defamatory text messages to other people.
Against the above backdrop, the need for registration of SIM cards first occupied the Tanzanian
parliamentary debates on August 18, 2008.6 In that parliamentary session, legislators were concerned
with three issues. First of all, most legislators who contributed to the need of a law on registration of
SIM cards raised concerns over cell phone theft. It was their view that if SIM cards were registered,
once a cell phone is stolen the owner could easily make a report of the theft to the service provider
who would then block it. Arguably, this view was too simplistic, since a service provider could block a
stolen cell phone even where the same was not registered.7 In fact, it used to be the practice by
service providers to block stolen cell phones in the early days when mobile phones were first put into
use in Tanzania.8 However this practice was abolished by the service providers presumably for
commercial reasons. This is so because, when a service provider blocks a particular cell phone, it
automatically affects sales of credit vouchers and also reduces customers.9 However, when a stolen
cell phone is transferred to another person it does not affect a service provider in any significant way
because it is less important to them who owns a cell phone but how much the owner spends in
making calls, texting messages, subscribing to various services marketed by the service provider, etc.
There is also another explanation behind the abolition of the practice. Sometimes people abused this
practice by making malicious reports to service providers for their own concealed reasons.10 As a
result, when service providers blocked such cell phones, owners would come and complain and
sometimes threatened the service providers with litigation. Secondly, most legislators were concerned
about anonymous defamatory calls and text messages. They associated use of unregistered SIM
cards with the commission of various offences. While this view is partly true, the claim had been
overestimated. This is so because, even after registration of SIM cards, doubts have been cast on the
effectiveness of the said registration in combating the increasing crime involving use of cell phones.11
The last concern, raised during the parliamentary session, was on the protection of subscribers' right
to privacy. It is interesting to note that only one legislator raised concern over the right to privacy.
Even though this was raised, no discussion took place on privacy. However, outside Parliament,
some people aired their views over the privacy concern about the registration of SIM cards.12
Based on concerns about cell phone theft as well as cell phone misuse generally, TCRA issued a
public notice on January 28, 2009 directing all service providers to register their subscribers' SIM
cards within a period of six months effective from July 1, 2009.13 However, it was not until January 27,
2010 that the Government introduced in Parliament the Electronic and Postal Communication Bill
2009 for its first reading. This Bill was passed into law two days later, i.e. on January 29, 2010.
Interestingly, no legislator raised concern over the individual's right to *C.T.L.R. 50 privacy, not even
the only legislator who warned of the potential breach of the right to privacy on August 18, 2008
created by such a law on the registration of SIM cards.
Overview of EPOCA
EPOCA was passed by the Tanzanian Parliament on January 29, 2010 and assented to by the
President on March 20, 2010. The Act came into force on May 7, 2010.14 It repealed and replaced15
two pieces of legislation in the Tanzanian communication sector: the Broadcasting Services Act16 and
the Tanzania Communications Act.17 It also amended18 the Tanzania Communications Regulatory
Authority Act19 and the Fair Competition Act.20 However, it saved all regulations made under the
repealed laws to the extent that they are not inconsistent with EPOCA and not expressly revoked.21
EPOCA was enacted with three fundamental objectives.22 The first was to address the challenges
posed by modern technologies, especially the convergence of technologies. The second was to
harmonise and consolidate communication laws in order to overcome regular conflicts in their
implementation, and the third was to introduce the Central Equipment Identification Register (CEIR)
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and registration of SIM cards. The Act has nine parts. Part I covers preliminary provisions. This part
has three sections providing for the name of the Act, its commencement date and application as well
as interpretation of key terms and phrases. Part II is titled Electronic Communications. It has 28
sections. It governs licensing, interconnection and access issues. Part III bears the title Postal
Communications. It also has 28 sections. This part regulates all matters pertaining to provision of
postal services. Part IV deals with competition issues and conduct. This part is the longest of all. It
has 55 sections. The most prominent part in Pt IV covers ss.84 to 102 which deal with the
establishment of CEIR and registration of SIM cards. This part is prominent because it introduces
significant development in the communications sector in Tanzania. It is this part which this article is
devoted to address. Part V deals with enforcement issues. It has only two provisions. Part VI is the
next longest part. It has 44 sections. This part deals with offences and penalties under EPOCA.
However, of particular importance in relation to this article are those sections which touch privacy of
communications arising from registration of SIM cards. Part VII deals with miscellaneous provisions. It
has seven sections. Part VIII deals with transitional matters with only one section and Pt IX deals with
amendments and repeals. It has 18 sections.
Registration of SIM cards and protection of privacy
There is no general data protection law in Tanzania. Nevertheless the Tanzanian Constitution23
generally guarantees the right to privacy. The relevant provision is art.16(1). It states:
“Every person is entitled to respect and protection of his person, the privacy of his own person, his
family and of his matrimonial life, and respect and protection of his residence and private
communications.”
However this right is not absolute. It is limited in art.16(2). This provision states:
“For the purpose of preserving the person's right in accordance with this Article, the state authority
shall lay down legal procedures regarding the circumstances, manner and extent to which the right to
privacy, security of his person, his property and residence may be encroached upon without prejudice
to the provisions of this Article.”
Further limitations to the enjoyment of the constitutional right to privacy are generally provided in
art.30(2) of the Tanzanian Constitution.24 Construing the latter provision, the High Court of Tanzania
has over and again held:
“A law which seeks to limit or derogate from the basic right of an individual on the grounds of public
interest, will be saved by Article 30(2) of the Constitution, if it satisfies two requirements: firstly, such
law must be lawful in the sense that it is not arbitrary. That means it should make adequate
safeguards against arbitrary decisions and provide effective controls against abuse of those in
authority when using the law. Secondly, the limitation imposed by such a law must not be more than
is necessary to achieve the legitimate object. This is also known as the principle of proportionality.”25
*C.T.L.R. 51 In the subsequent parts of this article the author evaluates the provisions of EPOCA
regulating registration of SIM cards in the light of the above-cited constitutional principles.
EPOCA places obligations on every person who owns or intends to use a mobile telephone to register
his or her SIM card.26 At the same time it places obligations on every service provider to obtain
information from buyers of SIM cards which identify them before activating such SIM cards in their
networks.27 The list of information that a potential subscriber must give to the service provider on his
or her identity includes: in the case of a natural person, full name of the potential subscriber, identity
card number or any other document which proves the identity of the potential subscriber, and
residential, business or registered physical address, whichever is applicable.28 In the case of a legal
person, the certificate of registration or incorporation, business licence, tax payers' identification
number certificate and where applicable value added tax will be required for registration purposes.29
In addition, a service provider may obtain “any other information” from potential subscribers which it
deems necessary.30 In effecting registration, a service provider is put under obligation to verify all the
information from a potential subscriber before he or she proceeds to register him or her.31 Once
registered, the information obtained from a potential subscriber will be retained in hard copy
documents or electronically.32 Where the information is obtained on behalf of a service provider, such
person who acted on his or her behalf is obliged to submit such information to the service provider
within 15 days.33 A service provider, on the other hand, is required to submit all subscribers'
information collected by himself or herself together with those by its agents to TCRA once in every
month.34 The latter preserves this information in the subscribers' database.35 As rightly argued by
Page3
Froomkin, once personal information is collected in a database the person from whom such
information was collected has significantly less control over his or her personal information.36 This loss
of control over one's personal information leads to a potential lack of the subscriber's knowledge of
data flows and blacklisting.37 In the same vein, Clarke posits that databases create a prevailing
climate of suspicion and repressive potential for a totalitarian government.38 In line with Froomkin and
Clarke, Sutherland argues that if the government knows your SIM card details, then it can monitor
your calls and text messages.39 Because of this, s.98 of EPOCA lays a duty on service providers to
ensure that the information collected from subscribers is kept secure, confidential and not tampered
with. This section states:
“98(1) a person who is a member, employee of application service licensee, or its agent, shall have a
duty of confidentiality of any information received in accordance with the provisions of this Act.”
It proceeds to state:
“98(2) no person shall disclose the content of information of any customer received in accordance
with the provisions of this Act, except where such person is authorised by any other written law.”
From this provision, it is clear that s.98 applies only to three categories of persons: a member of a
service licensee, an employee of a service licensee and an agent of a service licensee.40 Surprisingly
under s.91(1) and 91(2) of EPOCA, TCRA is also a custodian of the subscribers' information, yet
there is no provision in EPOCA which places upon it a duty of confidentiality. Although such a duty
may be implied under s.99 of EPOCA, it is still not adequate to bring TCRA within its ambit.41 And the
duty of confidentiality imposed under this provision is limited to “any information” received in
accordance with the provisions of EPOCA. Unfortunately the phrase “any information” as used in
s.98(1) of EPOCA *C.T.L.R. 52 is not defined. However, viewed narrowly, the information referred to
here may be that which reveals the identity of a subscriber which was submitted by a subscriber and
obtained by a service provider during registration of SIM cards. This is because, when reading ss.93
and 94 of EPOCA, reference is only made to this type of information. However, when one reads
s.98(1) in conjunction with s.98(2), which prohibits disclosure of the “content of information” of any
customer received in accordance with the provision of EPOCA, it definitely appears that the phrase
“any information” as used in s.98(1) is broad enough to encompass “content of information”. The latter
is sometimes referred to as “content of communication”. Section 3 of EPOCA defines the term
“content” as information in the form of speech or other sound, data, text or images whether still or
moving, except where transmitted in private communications. This type of information is not the one
submitted during registration of SIM cards but the actual messages or conversations transmitted over
service providers' networks when one makes a call to another person. One could therefore argue that
EPOCA is an interception law as it authorises interception of subscribers' content of communication,
because it would be illogical for the Act to prohibit disclosure of the content of information which was
not intercepted and retained in the first place.
As has been indicated above, s.98(2) of EPOCA permits disclosure of content of communication
where persons who disclose such information are authorised by “any other written law”. The phrase
“any other written law” is open-ended. This article attempts a non-exhaustive analysis of such laws in
order to determine if they incorporate adequate safeguards for the protection of individuals' right to
privacy. The Prevention of Terrorism Act42 is one such law which authorises interception of
communication. Section 31 of this Act empowers a police officer43 to intercept communications in
connection with the investigation of terrorist offences.44 However, before the police officer intercepts
such communication he must apply ex parte to the High Court of Tanzania45 and obtain a warrant of
interception of communications order. A police officer may only make an application for interception of
communication order with prior consent of the Attorney General.46 The High Court, if satisfied that
there are reasonable grounds to believe that material information relating the commission of a
terrorist offence or the whereabouts of a suspect of terrorist offence is contained in that
communication or communications of that description, may make an order requiring a service provider
to intercept and retain specified communication(s) received or transmitted, or about to be received or
transmitted by the service provider.47 Alternatively, the court may authorise the police officer to enter
any premises, and to install on such premises any device for the interception and retention of a
specified communication(s), and subsequently to remove and retain it.48 While s.31 of the Prevention
of Terrorism Act seems to have fulfilled the procedural requirement of art.16(2) of the Tanzanian
Constitution, it is doubtful if the same has satisfied the proportionality test under art.30(2) of this
Constitution. This is because s.31 does not state a limitation period for the order which the High Court
may grant. Because of this, a person who is a target of the said interception may find his
communication intercepted throughout, under the justification of an interception order of the High
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Court even when such investigation fails to reveal any material information linking him or her with the
alleged terrorist offence. Apart from that, this section is silent on what will happen to the
communication tapped by the police officer if it is not sufficient to warrant prosecution of the
suspected person. Closely similar to the Prevention of Terrorism Act is the Tanzania Intelligence and
Security Service Act.49 Section 15(1) of this Act empowers the Tanzania Intelligence and Security
Service (TISS) to investigate any person or body of persons whom it has reasonable cause to
consider a risk or a source of risk of a threat to the state security. In the course of investigation, TISS
can institute surveillance of any person or category of persons.50 It is worth noting that the Tanzania
Intelligence and Security Service Act contains the term “intercept” in the definition section but the term
is not found in any other provision of the Act. According to s.3, the word “intercept”, in relation to any
communication not otherwise lawfully obtainable by the person making the interception, includes to
hear, listen to, record, monitor or acquire the communication, or acquire its substance, meaning or
purport. And the word “interception” has a corresponding meaning to the word “intercept”. However,
the Act uses the term “surveillance” in its substantive provisions instead of “interception”.
Unfortunately, the former term is not defined in the definition section of the Act. However, surveillance
simply means the monitoring of the behaviour, activities or other changing information, usually of
people and often in a surreptitious manner.51 The former includes interception of electronically
transmitted information.52 It is arguable that although the Tanzania Intelligence and *C.T.L.R. 53
Security Service Act has avoided using the term “interception”, it still authorises interception under the
umbrella of surveillance. Moreover, since under s.28(2) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act, a police
officer also includes a member of the Tanzania Intelligence Security Service, the latter may still
enforce interception under that law. Be that as it may, the Tanzania Intelligence and Security Service
Act, when measured against the provision of art.16 of the Tanzanian Constitution, falls below the
constitutional protection of the right to privacy. This is because the Act does not prescribe any
procedure for such interception. The interception is warrantless. Moreover, this Act broadly and
loosely defines grounds for authorising interception. It simply provides state security as a blanket
ground for interception.
Besides the interception and disclosure of information under “any other written law” clause, EPOCA
itself authorises interception and disclosure of communication. Section 99 states:
“A person shall not disclose any information received or obtained in exercising his powers or
performing his duties in terms of this Act except -- (a) where the information is required by any law
enforcement agency, court of law, or other lawfully constituted tribunal; (b) notwithstanding the
provision of this section, any authorized person who executes a directive or assist with execution
thereof and obtains knowledge of information of any communication may -- (i) disclose such
information to another law officer to the extent that such disclosure is necessary for the proper
performance of the official duties of the authorised person making or the law enforcement officer
receiving the disclosure; or (ii) use such information to the extent that such use is necessary for the
proper performance of official duties.”
As can be noted from this provision, the grounds for interception and subsequent disclosure of
communication is only the need of such information by a law enforcement agency, court of law or
tribunal. There are no other criteria. In effect therefore, when there is no specific provision in “any
other written law” authorising a person to intercept and retain the content of communication or other
type of personal information, such person may still fulfil the requirements of s.98(2) by resorting to
s.99 of EPOCA. He can just come forward and tell the service provider he wants certain information
relating to a specific person by merely introducing himself as a police officer carrying out an
investigation related to that person. Assessed from the constitutional right to privacy in art.16 of the
Tanzanian Constitution, it obviously appears that s.99 of EPOCA fails to pass the proportionality test.
This is because the provision does not safeguard in any way subscribers' personal information held in
the subscribers' database. Moreover, no one is placed in a position to scrutinise whether the need for
intercepted information is justifiable in any way. Because of this, subscribers' personal information is
unsecured. Moreover, their communication can be intercepted at any time without any appropriate
remedy. Although EPOCA makes it an offence for any unauthorised person to intercept and disclose
any information,53 or for an authorised person, having intercepted such communication, to unlawfully
disclose it,54 it is difficult to enforce these provisions given the broad and loose drafting of ss.98 and
99 of EPOCA. Moreover, the Commission for Human Rights and Good Governance,55 which is
ordinarily vested with powers to deal with complaints arising from breach of the Bill of Rights, is not
well placed to make enforcements in relation to breaches of the constitutional right to privacy. This is
because the Commission cannot impose any binding determination. It can only make an investigation
of complaints and offer recommendations to the appropriate authority or a person in authority.56
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Conclusion
The analysis of the provisions of EPOCA regulating registration of SIM cards has revealed that
EPOCA is an interception law. Because of that, the Act was supposed to comply with the provisions
of art.16 of the Tanzanian Constitution which guarantees the right to privacy. As it is now, EPOCA
fails to provide adequate safeguards to privacy of personal information held in the subscribers'
database as well as the content of communications. The Act broadly and loosely defines grounds for
authorising interception and disclosure of the content of communication as well as personal
information revealing the identity of subscribers. Moreover, it fails to provide clear and adequate
procedures for interception and disclosure of communications. Where EPOCA permits interception
and disclosure of information through *C.T.L.R. 54 authorisation of other written laws, assuming that
such laws provide grounds for interception and safeguards, it has been revealed that such laws also
fall short of the required constitutional standards. Similarly, the permission of interception and
disclosure of information within EPOCA itself is problematic. Where a law enforcement agency such
as the police, a court of law or a tribunal needs any information including content of information of a
particular subscriber, this is a sufficient ground to require a service provider to make a supply. There
is no warrant required from a judge to initiate such a supply. Because of these loopholes, the author
recommends that EPOCA be amended immediately to put in place a harmonised procedure for
interception of communications. A warrant for interception from a judge is highly recommended. In the
same vein, a court of law should not be one of the institutions which may require intercepted
information, as is now the case. Also, the grounds for interception must be clearly defined in the said
amendments. The current and the only ground for supply of intercepted information which is based on
the mere need of a law enforcement agency, a court of law or a tribunal, should be repealed. Finally,
there should not be double standards in different laws. For example, while interception of
communications under the Prevention of Terrorism Act requires the warrant of a judge, interception
under the Tanzania Intelligence and Security Service Act does not require such a warrant from a
judge. The reasoning behind this recommendation is that, in both cases, interception of
communication is an ultimate result; hence compliance with the provisions of art.16 of the Tanzanian
Constitution is mandatory.
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